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Based on ethnographic fieldwork in the highlands of Barinas, this article investigates the 
impact of “twenty-first century socialist” policies on the Andean peasantry and the 
relationships established as part of Venezuela’s ongoing agrarian reform. The analysis 
explores the historical and material-cultural factors surrounding the production of coffee 
in the Andes and the dynamics, which have shaped a small group of growers. It also 
examines the recent efforts of the Bolivarian Government to increase domestic coffee 
production and support internal growers, suggesting that attempts to insert the state into 
the rentier structure of the coffee economy have somewhat inadvertently reinforced a 
working class consciousness. The ethnographic vignette illustrates the present 
relationship of state functionaries to coffee growers and narrates their analysis of the 
conditions, showing the contradictory effect these relations have on growers. The rest of 
the analysis locates the sources of this social awareness and its potential effect on state 
formation. The article concludes with a discussion of the role of class in history and a few 
observations about the future of peasant politics in the twenty-first century. 
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“…an insignificant minority of small producers wax rich, “get on in the world,” 
turn into bourgeois, while the overwhelming majority are either utterly ruined and 
become wage-workers or paupers, or eternally eke out an almost proletarian 
existence.” 
 
        –––Vladimir Lenin, The Development of Capitalism in Russia 
 
In this article, I advance an analysis that is ambivalent with regard to the peasantry in the 
Venezuelan Andes, suggesting these actors are the precipitates of the process of modern 
state formation and uneven capitalist development (Roseberry 1985; Yarrington 1997), 
but that they have an awkward relationship to capital and the state. In what follows, I 
explore the interactions of a group of coffee growers with the Venezuelan state as part of 
official efforts to build “a socialism for the twenty-first century” and the consciousness or 
social awareness that emerges from these interactions. Formed against the backdrop of a 
transition from a mostly rural society based on the export of coffee to a largely urban 
society based on the export of oil, I argue the consciousness of the Andean peasantry is 
contingent upon the regimes of growth that have emerged in the course of national 
development as well as the relations of coffee growers with a variety of surplus-takers. 
 This analysis was inspired by the often-perceptive observations of my informants 
and their insights into the conditions shaping the agency of coffee growers in the Andes. 
Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in 2009-2010, I present a series of illustrative 
encounters, which troubled my working assumptions about the peasantry and peasant 
consciousness. Returning to the approaches that inspired an earlier generation of agrarian 
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studies, I strive to restore the ambivalence that was always a central feature of the peasant 
category. As Henry Bernstein (2001) has argued, “the peasant” is often portrayed as “an 
absence of class,” rather than one specific outcome of the process of class formation 
(ibid: 30). As a result, the peasant is often regarded as an intrinsically egalitarian actor 
seeking to preserve or restore “a natural economy,” when in fact most peasants are petty-
commodity producers engaged in capitalist relations of production and exchange (see 
also Bernstein 1979; Lem 1988; Smith 1985). What are presented as essential features of 
the peasant livelihood or “culture” are in fact responses to an historical conjuncture 
marked by the decline of subsidies, less generous credit policies, and the general retreat 
of the state from rural areas. Weak prices for agricultural commodities and competition 
from larger monopolistic enterprises have also contributed to a rise in militancy among 
these actors, as they seek to regain the stability associated with previous regimes of 
growth and accumulation (see Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2010; Woolford 2010; Petras 
and Veltmeyer 2001). The influence of this activism has not been limited to rural areas, 
however. 
 The resurgence of global agrarian movements has encouraged scholars to 
reevaluate the political potential of the peasantry as well as their models for social change 
(e.g., Desmarais 2007; Edelman 1999; Edelman and Borras 2016). A leading force in the 
countermovement against neoliberal globalization, peasant organizations in the global 
south have been offered as models for the reconstruction of the world economy and 
politics (Holt-Gimenez 2006; McMichael 2006; Shiva 2008). Yet, the image of classless 
peasants striving to restore sovereignty over land and surpluses can be one-sided, and 
indeed, I argue, other images might be available to orient action.i In this article, I seek to 
illustrate how coffee growers in Venezuela were caught up with the rise of global 
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capitalist markets in the nineteenth century and how shifting regimes of growth over the 
course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have tended to push the consciousness 
of peasants in the direction of one of two poles––either capitalist or proletarian. 
 This analysis eschews romantic images of peasants as “precapitalist residues” or 
intrinsic “non-capitalists” in favor of an analysis that recognizes the dual character of 
peasants as owners of means of production and exploited laborers.ii While not objectively 
occupying the position of “free and right-less” proletarians, I argue the combination of 
the economic outlets and labor regimes available to coffee growers gives them a 
consciousness not unlike the proletariat and that contract relations with the Venezuelan 
state tend to reinforce this specific awareness. In this analysis, I identify the forces that 
have allowed this form of consciousness to surface at this specific historical conjuncture 
and the factors that make a working class identity a convincing representation of the lived 
reality of peasants. Finally, I discuss the interactions of coffee growers with technical 
experts and how these interactions shape peasants’ reading of their social position.iii  
 
The rise of a coffee republic and peripheral capitalism 
 
The cultivation of coffee in Venezuela began in the eighteenth century under Spanish 
colonial rule. Raised in areas where the trees could be shaded from the heat of the 
tropical sun, coffee did not readily compete with other crops for arable land or impose a 
specific set of labor relations. With few strict requirements, the crop could be grown in 
virtually any allotment size and be worked by slaves, smallholders, or wage laborers 
(Pendergast 2010; Roseberry 2001; Williams 1994). In Venezuela, the crop was largely 
the work of a free peasantry formed after the Federal War (1859-1863)(Ardao 1984). In 
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the nineteenth century, Venezuelan agriculture was based on bonded labor on large 
estates. These estates were typically commercial ventures that raised cash crops for 
regional and global markets. Slaves and tenants on these estates were usually given a 
subsistence plot as a condition of servitude, but such allocations seldom lessened the 
desire for land or their susceptibility to unrest.  
 In the aftermath of the contested elections of 1849, rural subalterns rose up 
against conservative landowners under the leadership of the Liberal Party. The ensuing 
conflict witnessed the destruction of estates in the western plains and the redistribution of 
hacienda lands. But the more radical aspects of this proto-agrarian reform were defeated 
in a series of elite compromises that restored the status quo (Figueroa 1974). The Federal 
War can be regarded––at least provisionally––as an instance of “original accumulation.” 
Yet unlike the classic case of “original accumulation” in England where peasants were 
driven from the land and integrated into urban areas as a class of free wage laborers (see 
Marx [1867] 1967), the destruction of the haciendas in the western plains of Venezuela 
did not lead to the formation of a landless proletariat. Instead, it resulted in a mass exodus 
of former slaves and tenants to the Andean frontier, where they succeeded in reacquiring 
access to land (Farias 1966; Roseberry 1985).iv  
 With precipitous slopes that could accommodate few crops except for coffee, the 
Andes formed a natural border zone that gave its residents relative autonomy from the 
central government. Serving as a safety valve for the tensions that might otherwise have 
erupted in Venezuelan society, the colonization of public lands gave displaced peasants 
free access to means of production and a chance to improve their livelihoods through 
labor investment. This “sweat equity” gave peasants a relatively strong position from 
which to enter into relations with elites. Mixing with recent European immigrants and 
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new arrivals from the coast, these erstwhile slaves formed a free peasantry––in the legal 
rather than Marxist sense––and the region grew rapidly as “new forests” cropped up and 
the nation was converted into “a coffee republic” (Price 1994; Roseberry 2001).v A 
relatively small portion of the colonial economy, prior to the nineteenth century, coffee 
had not occupied a large part of the active labor force. Yet with the rise of global 
markets, cultivation of the crop would take on a role, which owing the peculiarities of 
Venezuela’s development, not only led to the consolidation of the modern nation-state, 
but also to the genesis of capitalism.vi 
 Embodying the principle of comparative advantage, the cultivation of a high-
value crop within a limited geographic area gave coffee growers a degree of leverage 
over elites and the wider social formation. By the end of the nineteenth century, coffee 
accounted for more than half of Venezuela’s exports and it was also a key source of 
political power (Roseberry 1985). Largely responsible for the growth of port cities like 
Maracaibo and Puerto Cabello, the trade was also an impetus for investment in 
transportation infrastructure and the foundation of the modern banking system (Cardozo 
Galue 2013; Machado et al. 2001). Altering the structural and territorial organization of 
society, the trade encouraged the growth of new forms of social intercourse and 
consciousness. The Venezuelan historian Alberto Domingo Rangel (1969) argues Andean 
coffee growers were “able to feel like entrepreneurs” and that they enjoyed the prestige 
associated with ties to urban merchants.vii Likewise, the historian Doug Yarrington 
(1997) has suggested coffee growers in Venezuela were able to affect regional and 
national politics through these ties. But such ties also had a dual character.viii 
 Realizing a profit by transporting the commodity from a point of high 
concentration to a point of low concentration, merchant capitalists indirectly controlled 
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all the phases of production and exchange in the trade by extending credit to growers and 
monopolizing the transportation of the crop to its point of sale. This form of dependency 
gave merchants a degree of control over the rate of return based on the interest charged to 
peasants in advance of the sale of crops.ix Yet whereas peasants in other parts of the 
world reacted defensively against the exactions of mercantile elites (e.g., Scott 1976; 
Wolf 1969), in Venezuela, coffee growers accepted and benefited from these ties 
(Roseberry 1989).x While peasants in other parts of Venezuela languished in poverty, 
Andean peasants enjoyed a relatively prosperous existence and were able to take 
advantage of expanding markets to turn themselves into a burgeoning capitalist class. The 
alliance with merchant traders––although never one of total equality––seemed to benefit 
coffee growers as long as markets were expanding and they were able to employ new 
arrivals to the Andes as wageworkers. This pattern of growth was not to last, however.  
 Roseberry (1989) notes that in many ways petroleum simply replaced coffee in 
the rentier structure of the Venezuelan economy and that the extraction of oil by foreign 
companies was not radically different than the dynamics of the coffee trade. Yet in other 
ways, petroleum represented a heightening or aggravation of the contradictions of rentier 
capitalism. Based on the extraction of surplus from primary producers by way of credit 
and debt relations, this mercantile form of accumulation in agriculture was progressively 
subordinated to the exigencies of the petroleum industry over the course of the twentieth 
century, and the Venezuelan government sealed the fate of coffee by revaluing the 
currency to facilitate the import of capital goods for the energy sector (Coronil 1997; Karl 
1997). At the height of the coffee boom, Venezuela had been the third largest exporter in 
the world, shipping to the metropolitan capitals of Europe and North America (Roseberry 
1985). Yet by the mid-twentieth century, the sector was a shadow of its former self.  
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 The large agrarian capitalist enterprises, which formed during the peak years, fell 
apart and small-scale growers returned to their formerly marginal status. The decline of 
coffee also led to the decline of the Andes, as the region took a backseat to the urban 
coastal centers and extraction zones. Spurred by the growth of petroleum and a regime of 
accumulation in which productive capital was rewarded at rates far below the average 
rate of return on investment in the energy sector, in the 1960s, Venezuela underwent a 
“resource enclosure” that encouraged peasants to migrate to urban centers where their 
labor could be absorbed in the informal economy of petty-trading and services. The use 
of a strong national currency to redistribute rent from the oil industry also made 
Venezuelan coffee more expensive than its foreign competitors and unfavorable export 
conditions increased pressure on growers, turning the Andes into a zone of unrest.  
 In the 1960s, the region became a center of guerilla insurgency, as the Venezuelan 
government lost control of rural areas. However, Venezuelan elites were able to preserve 
power because the engine of economic growth had shifted. Already severely weakened 
by the decline of coffee, the guerillas failed to attract a large portion of their target social 
base, the peasantry, as the use of oil money to fund official agrarian reform efforts took 
steam out of the insurgency (see Ciccariello-Maher 2013; Powell 1971).  
 In the 1970s, the Venezuelan government sought to revive the coffee trade with a 
state regulatory board. Governing multiple aspects of the economy, including labor in 
warehouses, toasters, and transportation services, the board was also designed to regulate 
credit and prices with a quota system that could prevent gluts on the market (Henao 
Jaramillo 1982: 19). In this period, state-led industrial capital replaced merchant capital 
as the major means by which the value of harvests was realized (ibid). But economic 
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restructuring associated with the Third World debt crisis and the end of the International 
Coffee Agreement undermined these efforts (see West 2012; Wilson 2013).xi 
 In the 1980s, the Venezuelan coffee economy experienced a severe crisis, as 
prices fell and the total number of hectares under cultivation declined (ibid). Responding 
to pressure from international lenders and costs of production that exceeded returns, the 
Venezuelan government adopted a more flexible approach, ending subsidies and 
abolishing the state board. Effectively decoupled from the global markets and 
reintegrated into the national market on a narrower, more unequal basis, growers lost 
most of the leverage they had enjoyed over the twentieth century and underwent a 
process of re-peasantization. Not surprisingly, the Andes have been relatively quiet since 
the mid-twentieth century, but in recent years, the region has seen new struggles emerge. 
 
“Made in socialism”––coffee and the productivist state 
 
In 1998, the Bolivarian Government came to power pledging to redistribute the nation’s 
energy wealth and transform the role of agriculture in the Venezuelan economy. Aided by 
high oil prices and support from a variety of mass constituencies, one of the first policy 
moves of the new government was to enact an agrarian reform that challenged traditional 
landholding patterns and offered land to impoverished rural people (see Enriquez 2013; 
Enriquez and Newman 2015; Lavelle 2015; Page 2010). In the Andes, where much of the 
land was already in the hands of peasants, however, the key reform measure was El Plan 
Nacional Endógeno de Café.  
 Started in 2003, Plan Café, as it was popularly known, sought to increase the total 
number of hectares under cultivation by setting up state contracts, reverting to policies 
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similar to the 1970s. Yet whereas the coffee board in the 1970s was chiefly tasked with 
regulating prices, the new leadership was taking control of commercialization and 
cultivation in a bid to create an even stronger form of state corporatism. In the past, 
merchant capitalists had introduced the imperative to maximize output, but they did not 
control the labor process on farms and for the most part, saw no real interest in it. By 
contrast, the Ministry of Agriculture was concerned with increasing output for an internal 
market with a limited quantity of growers and hence with efficiency. Nationalizing large 
swaths of the processing industry as part of building a state-run system, the Ministry also 
began to increase the number of technical experts deployed to supervise contractees.  
 In contrast to stereotypical portrayals of bureaucrats as isolated from the 
communities they serve, the interactions of coffee growers with technical experts in 
Venezuela were considerably more intimate and complex than such images would allow. 
Instead of a force coming from “outside” the community (cf. Scott 1998), technical 
experts in the Andes were often drawn from the local area and most were quite familiar 
with the issues coffee growers faced. Against images of “the state” as a foreign agency 
impinging on the peasant community “from without,” in this case, the state was just as 
likely to appear in the guise of a relative with knowledge of the inner workings of public 
institutions and an ability to fill-gaps in knowledge of the bureaucracy and its practices. It 
is this mediating role and its centrality to the self-awareness of peasants that became 
apparent in my fieldwork and that is the focus of my analysis.  
 In 2009, I met Jose, a technical expert working for the National Institute of Lands 
in Barinas. Divided between highland and lowland areas, Barinas was one of five Andean 
states in western Venezuela where the bulk of the nation’s coffee cultivation was 
concentrated. Originally from a small town known as Calderas, Jose had moved to the 
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state capital to attend university and after graduation began working for Plan Café. His 
duties were now in the lowlands, but Jose still had ties with coffee growers in the Andes 
and he offered to take me to his hometown where the crop is still a key source income, 
although nowhere near as lucrative as in the past.xii Involving a multi-hour bus ride, the 
trip from the state capital to his hometown took us along precipitous slopes and curves 
that were so sharp the bus had to reverse itself several times to pass them. Nearly 1000 
meters above sea level, the climate of the region was temperate and its forests were 
dense, making it favorable for coffee planting.  
 Almost entirely bereft of the large estates found in other parts of Venezuela, the 
region was dotted with villages that were among the nation’s oldest colonial settlements. 
Long under the sway of Andean elites, the fate of these settlements had shifted with the 
fortune of caudillos and other military leaders and the region still bore marks of the 
violent political struggles of the past. Graffiti on the walls of buildings in the area 
depicted heroes of the guerilla insurgency of the 1960s and the slogans of leftist 
organizations like the Communist Party were visible. On the way Jose drew my attention 
to the reception depots, warehouses, and toasters taken over by the Venezuelan as part of 
“the socialist transition” that was shifting the coffee economy from private industry to 
state-run systems (Janicke 2009).  
 On the road into town, a large sign proclaimed the status of Calderas as “a pilot 
center” for Plan Café.xiii The bulk of growers in Calderas had titled plots of no more than 
five hectares, which in a good year yielded 80 sacks of beans––enough to buy the basic 
necessities of life. But in a bad year, this yield’s return might only be enough to cover the 
costs of cultivation, compelling growers to seek out loans to survive until the next season. 
In the 1980s, more successful growers had employed seasonal wage labor drawn from the 
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local area or migrants fleeing the civil war in Colombia. More recently, however, it had 
become difficult for growers to find labor, as young people often left the town for work 
in the city and growers were forced to band together using family networks for labor 
exchange. Jose recalled how when he was younger he used to help his uncle with the 
harvest, but how the practice had stopped when he went to college. During our trip, Jose 
hoped to visit his uncle, which would also give me a chance to learn more about the 
coffee trade and its transformations in recent decades.  
 Jose’s uncle lived in a caserío known as La Sabana several miles up a steep 
serpentine road that wound its way up from the valley where Calderas was located. The 
walk to reach his house lasted several hours and along the way Jose grew bored and 
began to sing a song by the Venezuelan folk singer Alí Primera celebrating the Cuban 
Revolution. Crossing paths with a coffee grower doubled over from the weight of the 
sack of beans he was carrying on his back, the man called out to us, “Look here’s Fidel 
Castro,” referring to the lyrics of the song, Jose’s long beard, and the history of guerilla 
movement in the region. Walking along a river that flowed out of the mountains, Jose 
told me how growers had been hurt in recent years and debts were starting to pile-up. 
After several hours of walking, we reached a cluster of trees that sheltered houses 
noticeably shabbier than the dwellings in the valley below. These were the houses of the 
coffee growers.  
 When Jose called out, his uncle came out of one of the houses and greeted us 
warmly. Neighboring growers who had already been hard at work for several hours, 
noticed the three of us sitting on large rock outside Jose’s uncle’s house, they used our 
presence as an excuse to take a break. Laying down their machetes and taking off their 
tool belts, a small group gathered around us, and Jose introduced me to the men, most of 
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whom he had known since childhood. Over the course of the dialog, the growers revealed 
feelings of frustration with merchants who advanced credit and profited from the sale of 
their crops, but also with officials who promised to liberate them from exploitation. The 
Ministry of Agriculture had pledged to alleviate their situation by stepping into the 
traditional role played by merchants as part of a system of contract cultivation. One of the 
growers seated near us, Julian, exemplified the growers targeted by the plan.  
 
>>Figure 1,“Proletarians” in the Venezuelan Andes, Barinas. Photo by author.<< 
 
 A lifelong friend of Jose’s, Julian lived in a small house with just enough land to 
eek out a living raising coffee. But we learned his situation in recent years had become 
even more precarious. Unlike other growers, Julian was fortunate enough to have a 
cousin who marketed his harvest in the state’s two largest cities––Barinas and Barinitas–
–which reduced the rate of exploitation he would have otherwise endured. But because 
his crop was hit with a blight known as la broca, Julian could only expect to receive fifty 
percent of the going rate on the open market. Julian confessed that if he could have 
secured work in a factory, he would have left Calderas a long time ago, but he stayed 
since there were few such jobs available.xiv The one saving grace of the situation was the 
fact that Plan Café did not pay based on the quality of beans, only the yield.  
 Thus, while contracted growers did not reap any rewards from higher quality 
harvests, Plan Café was attractive to marginal growers like Julian whose crops were 
damaged and who found it difficult to expand cultivation beyond their meager acreage. 
Julian also found it difficult to obtain fertilizer, which the plan offered at subsidized rates. 
For these reasons, it offered a better chance than the open market and even though it 
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placed him under the supervision of state experts, Julian signed up. However, when it 
came time to buy the harvest, the Ministry of Agriculture failed to deliver on its promises 
of a stable market.  
 The Department of Transportation from the nearby state enterprise never arrived 
and a great deal of the harvest was sold to the usual suspects. As Julian described, “When 
they don’t come, you start to get nervous, and then one day you suddenly just sell it.” 
Frustrated with the results, the coffee growers turned to Jose to offer an account of what 
transpired. Having previously worked with INTI, Jose knew the expert in question and 
faulted him for the failure. Angrily stating, “Everything he touches turns to shit. He’s a 
good for nothing [no sirve pa’nada],” Jose explained the expert had been twice demoted 
for poor performance, but had kept his job due to amigismo or ties with superiors. 
Invoking the historical precedent of the Liberator, Simon Bolivar, and his execution of 
General Manuel Carlos Piar during the War for Independence following an act of 
insubordination, Jose stated, “Bolivar was radical in his methods” and “he knew how to 
deal with problems.”  
 Suggesting––only half-jokingly––that the expert meet the same fate for 
“betraying the revolution,” Jose decried the fact that the Ministry of Agriculture was not 
doing more to help growers. Jose then gestured to the men seated around us saying, 
“Look at these people. Look at how they live. These are the poor––the working class [la 
clase obrera]. This is the proletariat [el proletariado]. These are the people socialism 
should help.” The men seated around us did not contest his evaluation and nodded in 
silent agreement. Engaged in arduous physical labor to create a commodity whose value 
they did not control––and for which they were scarcely remunerated––growers could no 




Peasants as proletarians––the Janus face of petty-commodity production 
 
My first reaction to this interpellation of coffee growers as “the proletariat” was to 
dismiss it as a mistake. These people farmed, owned land, and rarely if ever engaged in 
wage labor. Plainly, they were peasants. Yet, the more I reflected on his evaluation, the 
more I realized it grasped an essential feature of the conditions. It was not that Jose was 
poorly trained or did not grasp the concept; rather, his evaluation drew a parallel between 
growers and actors whose livelihoods although derived from different sources 
nevertheless seemed to mirror the experiences of his friends and relatives and whose 
struggles might therefore coincide. Seeing past the superficial ownership of land to grasp 
a deeper, more ambivalent aspect of the livelihoods of growers, Jose was able to make an 
analysis of the predicament that has often eluded formal intellectuals. 
 In his classic study of rural proletarian consciousness, Sidney Mintz (1974) 
offered a critique of a certain school of Marxists who were unable to grasp the desire of 
Cuban campesinos for land or work. Visiting Cuba shortly after the Revolution in 1959, 
these writers imagined peasants would desire land titles as part of an agrarian reform. Yet 
they were surprised to discover that these “peasants” showed little interest in land 
ownership and instead desired stable wages and work. Suggesting the inability of these 
writers to account for the aspirations of a large swath of the rural populace reflected a 
basic issue with their conceptualization of class and class-consciousness, Mintz argued 
these members of the peasant community were in fact “rural proletarians” and that they 
had been rendered inscrutable by the biases of urban observers and a misreading of the 
dialectic of class formation as a material and cultural process.  
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 Residing in rural areas with ties of kinship and affinity to smallholders, Mintz 
argued the consciousness of the rural proletariat did not just come from its relationship to 
the means of production, but also from the struggle to reproduce a household. Deriving 
its awareness from the direct experience of wage labor and interaction with other social 
groups, Mintz argued the consciousness of the rural proletariat was Janus-faced and that 
wage labor could actually reinforce a peasant lifestyle. Rural wage earners with relatives 
who owned land often contributed income to peasant households and these relations of 
dependence meant the consciousness of the rural proletariat was ambivalent and that it 
could have a culture that was not radically different from peasants (see also Roseberry 
1982; 1983; 1993; cf. Friedman 1980). This begs the question whether the opposite might 
also be true: that is, if the struggle to reproduce the peasant household could contribute to 
the growth of a set of relations that are analogous to wage labor and if the dual nature of 
petty-commodity production could give peasants a social awareness like that of wage 
workers. 
In his Chayanovian interpretation of agrarian political economy, Michael Watts 
(1994) has taken this reading a step further suggesting contract farmers are “hidden 
proletarians” paid “hidden wages.” Subject to both market and buyer dictates, these 
laborers have little control over the production process or the terms of exchange and thus 
function in relation to capital in much the same way as wageworkers. Concealed by a 
rural location and formal control of land, these actors have all of the trappings of 
ownership and none of the autonomy. In this arrangement, land is essentially a vehicle for 
peasant labor and capital is able to extract a surplus from the producer by way of a 
contract. If the terms of the contract are relatively generous, the peasant may enjoy a 
degree of freedom and ability to reinvest a portion of the surplus. But if the terms of the 
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contract become more extractive, the owner can begin to regard the situation as not much 
different than a wage laborer working for someone else.  
Somewhat counter-intuitively, Watts argues “the state” is the major vehicle for 
this form of proletarianization in the global south. At first glance, this is an odd assertion 
as much of the work of contract farming in the global south is the work of private 
corporations. But the veracity of this claim is readily apparent in Venezuela where the 
state has long played a central role in the regulation of agricultural production and has 
functioned as a “collective capitalist.” Repeating much of what transpired over the 
twentieth century, the Venezuelan government was leading a takeover of the coffee 
sector and processing industries. The integration of growers into the state system was 
conceived to alleviate “the simple reproduction squeeze” (Bernstein 2010; see Wilson 
2010) growers faced and to create a stable market that ran according to the logic of 
internal demand. But the integration of growers into these systems also made the state a 
potential antagonist.  
Efforts to provide both growers and consumers with stable prices involved a 
delicate balancing act that was only successful insofar as the system was lubricated with 
oil money. Any effort to erase subsidies or defray costs of production with an increase in 
the sale price of the state brand would only transfer “the squeeze” from one group to 
another. And there was already evidence of the likely consequences of such a policy. In 
2006, weak prices for coffee growers sparked protests and strikes across the country, 
leading to shortages (Baribeau 2006). Four years later, the Ministry of Agriculture was 
striving to avoid a replay of events, paying higher prices to growers, while taking 
advantage of the frictions to displace intermediaries. In spite of the tensions involved in 
the state’s operating as de facto capitalist and monopolizer of the terms of the sale of the 
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crop, growers in Calderas actively sought integration into the new system. In this regard, 
the consciousness of the average grower seemed as much like a worker seeking a stable 
job as an entrepreneur searching for a business opportunity. 
 
The logic of capital and the peasant household 
 
It is now somewhat of a convention to argue that peasants resist the commodification of 
land and labor as well as integration into state projects (e.g., Bunker 1991; Scott 1998). 
Yet as scholars like Jim Glassman (2006) and Guy Standing (2011) have argued, laboring 
peoples have often fought for the commodification of labor power and the regularization 
of its terms of sale (see Roseberry 1976, 1982). What coffee growers in Calderas seemed 
to desire most was a stable price and buyer for their crops, which encouraged integration 
into systems of production and exchange that were more “classically capitalist” in form. 
The desire of growers to have Plan Café purchase their harvests and ensure the 
realization of value went hand-in-hand with the regularization of credit, processing, and 
commercial relations, which together with the technical, organizational, and occasional 
political, advice of experts like Jose, was bringing them closer to total commodification 
and further down the road of proletarianization into new conflicts with the state qua 
capital.xv 
 With few chances to achieve their previous historic successes, growers were 
attracted to the stability associated with a regulated market. A contract with the 
Venezuelan government was a chance to stabilize incomes and reduce risk. However, 
since the state had assumed the structural position occupied by merchants the frictions of 
rentier capitalism were effectively preserved.xvi Functioning in relation to capital in much 
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the same fashion as wage laborers, growers were formally subsumed by the logic of 
petty-commodity production, but they were also partially protected from the vicissitudes 
of the market, encouraging them to increase yields and forgo the autonomy associated 
with land ownership (cf. Chayanov 1966; Kautsky 1988 [1899]; Lenin 1964 [1899]). 
Though the state advanced credit and monopolized harvests, it was far less usurious than 
the average merchant and its loans were often forgiven, making it the more attractive 
partner.   
 From the standpoint of the peasant, the circulation of merchant capital could be 
read as the extraction of surplus value, calling forth feelings of dependency and 
exploitation, or it could be grasped as a pattern of circulation giving rise to their own 
cycle of accumulation leading to prosperity (Roseberry 1978b).xvii Which aspect of the 
petty-commodity relation prevailed in the consciousness of the peasant––owner of means 
of production or exploited laborer––largely depended on the size of the market, whether 
the market was expanding, and the character of relations with surplus-takers. The 
comparative drudgery ratio identified by Chayanov as the logic of the peasant enterprise 
is just that––comparative (cf. Shanin 1986: xvi).xviii 
 In the nineteenth century, the return on labor and capital invested in a cash crop 
like coffee offered a real chance to improve one’s lot and escape poverty. In the late 
twentieth century, such investment was a risky endeavor that only likely offered a path to 
foreclosure. Thus, I argue the divergence in the social awareness of the Andean peasantry 
from the nineteenth to the twenty-first centuries is based on the relatively restrictive 
terms for the realization of the value of harvests and the experience of previous 
generations. In the nineteenth century, peasants escaped the haciendas and set up their 
own enterprises, enjoying new freedoms as a result. Growers were the engines of the 
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Venezuelan economy and they were able to exercise a degree of leverage over urban 
elites. In the mid-twentieth century, they had still employed wage labor drawn from 
marginal sources such as the refugees fleeing the civil war in Colombia or the children of 
friends and neighbors. By the late twentieth century, all this had changed.  
 At the start of the twenty-first century, coffee growers were among the most 
marginal actors in Venezuelan society and they were much less affluent than their 
predecessors. From the standpoint of urban Venezuelans, coffee growers were a standard 
of social backwardness and the image of a poverty-stricken farmer was far more likely to 
be attached to the Andean peasantry than that of a successful entrepreneur. This 
“structure of feeling” (Williams 1975) was also exacerbated by the fact that much of the 
rest of the population was engaged in non-productive labor designed to capture a portion 
of the oil rent in circulation, which although it did not create value, was often easier than 
swinging a machete all day. Beyond its relative ease, such activities could also still afford 
a feeling of autonomy and proprietorship. By contrast, the labor of coffee growers could 
only be regarded as onerous and it was difficult to regard oneself as an independent 
entrepreneur, when experts were removing the last vestiges of control over the cultivation 
process.  
 Forming an impoverished stratum, growers led lives of relative and at times 
absolute deprivation that offered few comforts aside from masculinist pride at their 
tenuous independence and disparagement of feminized labor. When I asked coffee 
growers in 2009 if they supported state cultivation contracts that would take the place of 
relations with merchants, most responded positively, intrigued by the prospect of a 
greater return. Merchants were no longer viewed as intermediaries facilitating access to 
lucrative markets, but rather as exploiters taking most of the value of harvests. With such 
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exactions mounting, growers were willing to accept supervision by technical experts and 
a sense they were working for the state as long as the terms of the contract were more 




In 2011, bad weather and speculation drove global coffee prices up to a 34-year high. The 
going rate for a pound of high quality Venezuelan beans was around 15 US dollars, 
which encouraged the Venezuelan government to seek out new export outlets (Boothroyd 
2012). As part of a plan called El Fondo Bicentenario, the Ministry of Agriculture began 
to subsidize export cultivation in several states, following a pattern of trade and 
investment not wholly unlike the mid-twentieth century. Seeking to increase non-
petroleum income, the Venezuelan government targeted Middle Eastern and European 
markets with the slogan, “To speak of Venezuelan coffee is to speak of quality.” As a 
result of these efforts, the Ministry of Agriculture claimed to have increased total coffee 
production to 981 tonnes in 2012, a 145 percent increase from 2010 (Prensa Café 2012.) 
Yet in spite of these successes, Venezuela’s geopolitical commitments were creating 
difficulties for small-scale growers. 
 The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America pact signed by several 
states in the region forced Venezuela to open up its markets to foreign suppliers, 
introducing an element of competition into the equation. In many parts of Venezuela, the 
coffee consumed by the average person was as likely to come from Brazil or Nicaragua 
as local growers and issues with state-run processing facilities were also adding to the 
strain on the system.xx In 2010, widespread complaints about the quality of the state 
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brand and tensions with retailers led the Ministry of Agriculture to create El Consejo 
Nacional del Café to oversee the sector and the seizure of several outlets integrated into 
La Corporación Venezolana del Café (Tal Cual 2015). The creation of these institutions 
did not ease tensions, however. 
 In 2012, workers in plants in Barinas and other states publicized the loss of large 
usable harvests due to corruption and malfeasance (Tribuna Popular 2012). Tensions with 
contracted growers were also mounting meanwhile. A byproduct of the process of 
petroleum extraction, the nitrate fertilizer that is crucial to the success of non-organic 
harvests was increasingly difficult to obtain in the wake of falling oil prices. These 
shortages, coupled with a lack of state funds and weak wages, sent shockwaves through 
the system, as a wave of strikes spread to the lowlands.  
 Growers who had previously greeted Plan Café as a way to stabilize their 
livelihoods and incomes were now openly talking of its failure. Feeling caught between 
the state and private market, growers sought ways to avoid government price controls by 
selling harvests in Colombia or engaging in kickback schemes in which technical experts 
wrote off contracted harvests as a loss and then received payments from the sale. Under 
these pressures, the state brand of coffee began to disappear from store shelves and when 
available, it was often of such poor quality that my informants described it as 
“undrinkable.”  
 Like the merchant capitalists they sought to replace, the Ministry of Agriculture 
was advancing credit and buying harvests, which growers regarded favorably so long as 
they could not access more lucrative outlets. But when such outlets emerged and the state 
system was no longer lubricated with oil, the official market began to break down. The 
“squeeze,” which would have been transferred to consumers was instead transferred to 
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contracted growers and there was a marked shift in their attitudes as a result. Growers 
complained that the state was not much different than traditional intermediaries and that 
the purchase of the harvest was never truly guaranteed. Yet whereas most growers had 
little leverage over merchants, withdrawal from cultivation contracts affected state food 
security programs––a key source of support for the ruling party. The plan that sought to 
increase domestic production and create stable internal markets also sought to harness the 
labor of the peasantry under the supervision of experts in a specific configuration of labor 
and capital that also offered the grist for a working-class consciousness. 
 If classes only exist in relation to one another and they derive their awareness 
from shared interaction (e.g., Lukács 1972; Poulantzas 1978; Roseberry 1985; Wolf 
1999), the interactions of coffee growers with technical experts and merchants in 
Venezuela gave them an awareness of their status as “a class of labor” (Bernstein 2010) 
whose surplus product was taken away and whose ties with other such “workers” might 
not only be the key to more stable livelihoods, but also to greater leverage in politics. 
Growers did not have to respond to the pressures they faced with self-exploitation or 
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i Henry Bernstein (2010) calls this image of solidarity among the fellaheen peoples of the 
world, “peasant internationalism.” He argues this image is not based on conditions 
prevailing across the global south, but rather what he calls “emblematic instances” or 
examples treated as the natural state of these actors. 
ii The distinction between “capitalist” and “non-capitalist” is not especially useful when 
discussing petty-commodity production. There are instances where petty-commodity 
producers can outcompete wage labor and more fully capitalized systems of production. 
Yet scholars rarely refer to proletarian wage laborers as “non-capitalists” in either an 
historical or sociological sense simply because they do not own means of production. The 
equation seems to change, however, when observers discuss peasants. Although peasants 
can be “non-capitalists” in the sense that they do not always employ wage labor or own 
means of production, they can also accumulate capital via commodity production. To 
avoid such ambiguities, I avoid using terms that suggest epochal transitions or universal 
classifications, instead focusing on specific relations of production and exchange. 
iii Writers have recently generated sophisticated analyses of the strategies adopted by 
agrarian social movements, but the theme of “collective consciousness” has tended to 
drop out of research. For a notable exception, see the debate between Brass (2000, 2002a, 
2002b) and Beverley (1999, 2004). 
iv In The Development of Capitalism in Russia, Lenin (1899) linked the growth of 
capitalist relations to a home market for agricultural and industrial products. The 
dissolution of non-capitalist forms of labor mobilization and surplus extraction released 
the supply and ultimately the demand capable of feeding modern industry.  
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Roseberry (1978a) argues Lenin’s model cannot be taken as a universal and that capitalist 
relations can equally arise on the basis of export markets, leading to distinct historical 
trajectories. One path leads to unbalanced growth glossed as “underdevelopment,” while 
the other leads to “a capital revolution” and class differentiation among the peasantry. In 
contrast to the Russian case, the Andean peasantry in Venezuela arose with the world 
market and coffee production based on wage labor was never fully or even primarily 
directed at domestic consumption; thus, the home market cannot be the key diagnostic for 
capitalist production. This is not to find fault with either Lenin or Roseberry, but simply 
to say that Russia and Venezuela are different cases. 
v Price (1994) argues European migration to the region was largely unsuccessful from the 
standpoint of setting up new agricultural enterprises and that the bulk of migrants became 
merchants. 
vi This argument represents a challenge to Modernization and Dependency theory, both of 
which long held that Latin American agriculture was “backward” or “underdeveloped.” 
vii The mercantile bourgeoisie in Venezuela had a relatively high level of class-
consciousness likely due in part to its ethnic segmentation, with many prominent trading 
families coming from Italian, German, and British backgrounds. 
viii The dual character of the peasant as capitalist and worker has been established 
elsewhere. Marx (1988 [1863) observed that as owner of means of production, the simple 
commodity producing peasant is a capitalist, but as a manual laborer, a potential wage 
slave to “himself” and others. Lenin (1965 [1919]) also recognized that “As a profiteer he 
is…hostile to the proletarian state; he is inclined with the bourgeoisie...But as a working 
man [sic], the peasant is a friend of the proletarian state, a most loyal ally of the worker in 
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the struggle against the landowner and the capitalist” (original emphasis, 488). The 
peasant, thus, can be seen to be both a capitalist who owns means of production and takes 
profit from the sale of commodities on the market and a worker who may have few 
options apart from self-exploiting labor. 
ix In contrast to Roseberry (1978b), I see nothing specifically “capitalist” about merchant 
capital. Roseberry writes, “[w]here interest is the primary method for extracting surplus 
value from the direct producers, the usurer has imperfect control over production” (9). If 
‘production’ here includes the labor process, the usurer has no control over it. When 
accumulation takes place in the sphere of circulation, the merchant can seize hold of the 
means of production through debt and foreclosure such that peasant property is turned 
into a classic capitalist enterprise employing wage labor (often of the former owner), or 
debt can “squeeze” the peasant, narrowing the range of options in terms of crops, sale 
outlets, etc. But this dynamic is not consistent real subsumption or capital in the sphere of 
production, and hence, not capitalism. The usurer’s control of the labor process is not 
“imperfect”; it is non-existent. The usurer controls the process of exchange and 
realization of value, but cannot specify all the relations of production on the farm because 
the penetration of capital is incomplete. By contrast, technical experts were empowered 
to direct the actual labor process on the farm, including the application of fertilizer, 
planting of trees, weeding, etc. In spite of superficial similarities between the two forms, 
this supervisory role was distinct from relations with merchants and contributed to a 
stronger “proletarianziation effect.”  
x While Venezuelan anthropologists have rightly pointed to the persistence of indigenous 
cultural influences on the Andean peasantry (e.g., Clarac de Briceño [1970] 2016), these 
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actors are largely of recent historical origin and typically regard themselves as mestizos 
or descendants of European settlers. Moreover, Roseberry (1989) argues these peasants 
never enjoyed subsistence guarantees from aristocratic elites and that they arose with, not 
against, the world market. 
xi These authors suggest that fair trade did not solve the problem of the intermediary for 
most coffee growers; it simply globalized it. 
xii Most residents live in or near the state capital. In spite of this divide, mobility between 
the two geographic zones is a regular feature of the economic life of the region.  
xiii Europeans began to arrive in Calderas in the seventeenth century, but the population of 
the town was relatively small until the coffee boom two hundred years later. Originally 
an indigenous settlement, prior to 1870, Calderas was not listed as a district in the state 
cadaster, and the 1877 census lists the area as only having a population of “236 residents 
in 55 houses.” By 1891, the population had nearly tripled to 686 with the town and 
surrounding area now being listed as “a municipality” (Del Real Montilla 1973: 112). At 
the end of the boom, a wave of migrants from the neighboring state of Trujillo came to 
the area in search of new lands to colonize. The more extensive cultivation associated 
with falling prices at the end of the century led to a consolidation of landholding in 
Trujillo, forcing out smaller, indebted growers. The migrants who made their way to 
Calderas, thus, were likely to have been people adventurous enough––or desperate 
enough––to strike out on their own and set up new enterprises. Today, Calderas has more 
than 5000 people, most of whom are involved in some aspect of the trade. 
xiv Although growers farmed subsistence plots called conucos, it was difficult to convert 
the bulk of their acreage to other uses. The living “infrastructure” built up by coffee trees 
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encouraged growers to expand cultivation in the face of falling prices, rather than switch 
crops. 
xv I agree with Chayanov (1966) that categories like “wages” and “profit” cannot be 
easily applied to the peasant household, but Watts likely introduces the vocabulary of 
“hidden wages” and “hidden proletarians” to grasp the phenomenology of life under 
contract. 
xvi The irony of Venezuelan history is that coffee growers seem to have a social 
awareness and modes of action closer to that of the proletariat, i.e. seeking stable 
employment, striking, etc. when they are de-linked from global markets than when 
integrated into them. I attribute this “anomaly” to the unevenness of capitalist 
development and the peripheral status of the nation in the world system. 
xvii Capital circulation (M-C-M) can feel like capitalist production (M-C-C-M) from the 
standpoint of the laborer if the conditions under which the former is taking are place 
deteriorating or when the rate of return is less than favorable when compared to extant 
historical standards or the prevailing images in society. Roseberry (1978) writes, “…the 
merchant purchases…labour power, with the initial outlay of money, and receives 
another commodity (e. g. corn, coffee) in the final transaction (C-M’). Between the two 
transactions is a production process (C-C’), which creates value. In other words, 
merchant/usurers’ capital initiates a movement (M-C-C’-M’) similar in formula to the 
movement (M-C-C’-M’) of industrial capital (10). 
xviii In the third volume of Capital, Marx introduces the concept of an “historical standard 
for the reproduction of labor power” in relation to “specific configurations of capital” as 
the basis for grasping “the everyday consciousness of the agents of production” (1992 
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[1894]: 118). According to Marx, this standard is calculated based on a variety of 
material and subjective factors, which only take on their full meaning in a specific 
conjunction. Rather than an objective quantity of surplus, Marx tells us this standard is 
judged according to “the habits and expectations” of the laborer. In a given historical 
period, the rate of return for a specific form of labor can be taken as favorable when 
judged against existing standards; while in another period, the same pattern of labor 
relations and surplus distribution can be read as intolerable and likely to provoke 
resistance. In a related discussion, Marx tells us that “English workers need beer and 
French workers need wine” and that this historically variable level is a key point of 
struggle. By the same token, we can say that Venezuelans “must have coffee” and that 
this gives growers the ability to exact concessions from the state. In this sense, one can 
find certain convergences between the classical Marxist and Chayanovian models. 
xix Growers can respond to this “squeeze” in a number of ways, including doubling-down 
on self-exploitation and the labor of kin and neighbors or reducing consumption and 
hiring wage labor, while taking on debt in hopes of reaping a harvest that will make up 
for the shortfall. If successful, a grower can pay off liens and restart the process of capital 
accumulation. More often than not, however, this response signals the start of a cycle 
leading to foreclosure. But the creditor in this case, the Venezuelan state, preferred not to 
seize the land, but instead to buy consent, hence the unevenness of proletarianization.  
xx Venezuela imported more than 50 percent of its green coffee to cover demand in the 
wake of shortages induced by price regulations in 2003. By 2018, that figure had risen to 
over 70 percent. 
